2025 SOF Imperatives Survey

The SOF Imperatives initiative highlights Global SOF’s recommended priorities for U.S. Special Operations, highlighting to U.S. Congressional leadership the fact that U.S. and partner SOF are among the most capable and affordable instruments in safeguarding our security.

An essential element of this program is an annual SOF Imperatives “platform” document that educates U.S. policymakers about the needs of the SOF community. Please take a moment to review our previous SOF Imperatives documents by clicking HERE.  

By completing this survey, you are sharing your experience and expertise to help us inform this year’s document.

Thanks for your support of the SOF Community!

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Survey will close 30 NOV 2024, so please complete the survey and share with your network prior to that date.

Questions? Contact info@gsof.org.

I. BACKGROUND: During FY25 posture hearings, General Fenton and ASD(SO/LIC) Maier highlighted that demands on SOF are increasing while the USSOCOM budget is declining. They stated that Combatant Commands’ demand for SOF capabilities in support of National Defense Strategy priorities exceeds capacity, highlighting that over the past four years, “SOF support to Combatant Command activity to counter coercion and deter aggression has more than tripled – comprising nearly 50% of SOF’s deployed and forward presence.” Meanwhile, as Senate Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Senator Roger Wicker noted during the same posture hearing, Congress needs “to know what you need to accomplish this mission. The demands on SOCOM are increasing. Meanwhile, it is being asked to accept significant risk because it is under-resourced. Its budget has remained flat since 2019. When you adjust that for inflation, this amounts to roughly a 14 percent budget cut in purchasing power.”

II. BACKGROUND: The Commission on National Defense Strategy made specific recommendations to Congress about funding levels at DOD and across the interagency. Specifically, the Commission noted: “Given the severity of the threats, the FY 2027 and later budgets for all elements of national power will require spending that puts defense and other components of national security on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

III. BACKGROUND: During FY25 posture hearings before Congress, General Fenton and ASD(SO/LIC) Maier testified that, in the past three years, “the requirement for USSOCOM to fulfill its crisis response remit has increased more than 130% over the previous decade's annual average.” These no-fail missions require immediate resourcing that can, as General Fenton and ASD Maier testified, “draw resources away from modernization efforts that aim to meet future challenges.”

IV. BACKGROUND: In its July 2024 report to Congress, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States highlighted that “special operations forces remain an essential tool of military power, both for their contributions to the remaining threat from violent extremists and because special operations forces have a vital role in great power competition—particularly in building influence with allies and partners and countering grayzone threats.” The report also recommended that SOF force structure should be preserved, a stark contrast to Army plans to cut critical SOF elements. The Commission recommended that Army, “in particular shift resources from counterterrorism and direct action to unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, and foreign internal defense.” Concerns about these cuts have been raised by numerous Members of Congress and outside experts.

V. BACKGROUND: At less than 2% of the DOD budget, SOF provide a decisive advantage for the Nation. One element of the SOF value proposition is the extensive, global network of relationships which allow SOF to build partner force capacity. These generational relationships are critical to maintain and expand. As the Commission on National Defense Strategy final report noted, “as the Israel-Hamas war demonstrates, the Iranian and violent extremist organization threats necessitate continued investments in special operations forces and security force assistance brigades to build partner capacity.”

VI. BACKGROUND: While much of DOD still wants to treat irregular warfare as a “lesser included case” of conventional warfare (and treat capabilities accordingly), SOF know better. That said, they still need to be able to operate in both IW and high-end settings. How can SOCOM best maximize the utility of its platforms and gear for missions at both ends of that spectrum?

VII. BACKGROUND: The 2024 GSOF Imperatives report highlighted the critical role the SOF medical community plays building critical skills and enhancing societal resilience in the event of conflict. GSOF identified the need for enhanced DOD authorities to enable SOF medics to train not just military counterparts but foreign civilian medical personnel and entities. That critical resilience-building authority was included in the FY25 NDAA (note: pending final bill text verification).

VIII. BACKGROUND: The Commission on National Defense Strategy final report highlighted that USSOCOM’s “acquisition model outpaces that of the services” and General Fenton has touted USSOCOM’s use of acquisition authorities as being critical to success for SOF. The Atlantic Council’s 2024 report, Stealth, Speed, and Adaptability: The Role of Special Operations Forces in Strategic Competition, similarly noted that SOF “is a leader in identifying, testing, fielding, and evolving new, cutting-edge technologies across the Department of Defense and the IC. Appropriately resourced, USSOF can continue to advance innovation adoption for the Joint Force at a time when doing so is essential for strategic competition.”

IX. BACKGROUND: USSOCOM via the SOFCIDS (Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System) acquisition process, enjoys JROC (Joint Requirements Oversight Council) authority to approve SOF peculiar requirements, however, this does not allow for exceptions to existing acquisition law. The pace at which special operations forces are required to adjust and spiral-develop existing and emerging technologies needs a more proactive approach to major program management and execution.

X. BACKGROUND: Under the category of Combat Development and Evaluation, special mission units within USSOCOM are granted F&DR (Fielding and Deployment Release) authority to evaluate and employ new technologies and products to gain battlefield comparative advantage. Non-Special Mission Units are not granted this authority and are therefore required to employ what may be legacy technologies and equipment.

XI. BACKGROUND: Congress has identified special operations maritime gaps as of particular concern. In the FY24 NDAA, Congress directed SOCOM and SO/LIC to report on how SOCOM is “ensuring that the development and acquisition of maritime capabilities meet its requirements over the mid- and long-term, address capability gaps and maintain comparative advantage in the maritime domain, and support implementation of the National Defense Strategy.”

XII. BACKGROUND: In response to that the congressional maritime gaps reporting requirement, SOCOM and SO/LIC reported that “Maritime SOF has persistent gaps related to maritime mobility and force projection in contested environments.” Specifically, SOCOM and SO/LIC reported that many of these gaps “are related to logistics and sustainment, including the ability to transport supplies and resupply over long distances and without significant infrastructure… The current logistics infrastructure was designed for and tested in permissive environments. Access to traditional fixed forward logistics sites will not be assured in crisis or conflict, and Maritime SOF will face significant challenges including refueling, rearming, repair, and replacing combat losses.”

XIII. BACKGROUND: While SOF and its aviation capabilities have successfully performed in a counterterrorism role, the effectiveness of SOF aviation in Irregular Warfare has yet to be fully realized, e.g., operating well left of conflict in the gray zone in foreign internal defense/SFA, or stability operations.

XIV. BACKGROUND: In their 2024 Posture hearing testimony, General Fenton and ASD Maier highlighted the value – and current limitations – of the SOF-Cyber-Space Triad. According to their joint testimony, “Strong collaboration in support of SOF, space, and cyber operations with other Combatant Commands ensures synchronization across warfighting domains. The nexus of USSOCOM, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Space Command, and U.S. Strategic Command, each with a specific functional focus, creates synergy with complementary capabilities to support the Joint Force. This nexus specifically enhances kill webs—the integration of sensors from seabed to space and the options to eliminate targets. It also creates new opportunities to degrade an adversary’s confidence and capabilities before conflict. For example, SOF often require cyberspace and space capabilities to see and sense the operational environment and, if needed, conduct strikes against an adversary. Likewise, cyberspace and space operations often rely on SOF’s physical access to deliver effects to enhance Joint Force targeting.” USASOC in particular has been at the forefront, effectively explaining the value and rationale for the need to strengthen and further develop the SOF-Cyber-Space Triad. To ensure seamless joint operations that fully leverage one another, both USSOCOM, Cyber Command, and the Space Force can take strategic and operational actions that enhance interoperability, maximize capabilities, and optimize resource use. This can include integrated mission planning, shared command and control infrastructure, expanded joint training and exercises, and mutual capability development, for example. 

XV. BACKGROUND: Expansive digital collection and commercialization of user-level data information is a part of today’s world. Every individual has digital signatures and patterns of life that risk being exploited by our adversaries. While the success of SOF depends on the access and placement required to complete the mission, SOF must have the skills, training, and equipment to manage detection in not just the physical, but also the virtual world. This digital force protection begins well in advance of any mission. As SOCOM has previously identified, “…for some missions the operators simply accept an undesirable level of risk that they will be detected and their mission compromised to some extent. For this reason, any new technologies that allow the warfighter to avoid threats, skip mission steps, or reduce the likelihood of detection are of interest to USSOCOM.”

XVI. BACKGROUND: According to the 2023 Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment, “our ability to gain and sustain information advantages at the times and places of our choosing are critical to successful operations in the information space.” The strategy notes the importance of a “cultural shift” across DOD where information operations is “a foundational element of all military strategies…”